Twelve Long Paces – Part 2

PART 2 – THE PANNEL IS A LANDED GENTLEMAN

On 8 June 1822 written Defences to the Indictment (a procedural step not now in use), written by Cockburn, were lodged on behalf of Stuart. The main planks of the defence were set out in the following excerpts: “the pannel is a landed gentleman…..whose concern in [the duel] was excusable and unavoidable: ….. the pannel  was  guilty  of  no  offence  or  irregularity  in  the mode  in  which  he  discovered  that  Sir  Alexander  Boswell was  the  author  of  these  calumnies; …..the  charges  of  malice  against  [Stuart] — of  a  determination  to  provoke  him  or  any  of  the  other  lieges  to  fight with  the  pannel,  and  of  absconding  from  justice,  are  all  utterly  denied.” The document made it clear that the defence were going to prove that Boswell was the author of the libellous pieces and that the sordid history of the Beacon and the Sentinel would be revealed to the jury. It ended with a confident prediction –  “however  deeply [Stuart] deplores the  melancholy  event  which  has  occasioned  this  investigation,  he  is  satisfied  that,  if  he  be  tried  by  his  peers,  he  cannot  be  found  guilty  of  any  crime.”

The Trial Begins

The case of Her Majesty’s Advocate v James Stuart called for trial on Monday 10 June 1822 less than three months after the duel. It was held in the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh. Writing some years later Cockburn said that “No Scotch trial in my time excited such interest” (Memorials p396).There spoke a man involved in Scottish criminal trials as counsel and as a judge over a period of fifty years. According to the Scotsman account of the trial published a few days later public interest was at fever pitch and the “avenues to the Court” were crowded for several hours before the trial started and throughout its duration. The Court sat continuously until a verdict was reached in the early hours of the next day. By then the atmosphere in court must have been ripe with more than anticipation.

As was the practice then there were several judges. In the chair was Lord Justice Clerk Boyle. The others were Lords Hermand, Succoth, Gillies and Pitmilly. Lord Meadowbank recused himself because of the advice he had given Boswell before the duel.  Lord Pitmilly was a friend of the pannel and he left the court before the trial ended. The judges were accompanied on the bench by distinguished lay observers including Prince Czartoriski from Poland, a Whig peer Lord Belhaven and the Honourable Henry Fox, the nephew of Charles James Fox. A vestige of this practice of having dignitaries on the bench lingered on into modern times at the beginning of High Court circuits held in Inverness.

The Crown team was led by the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor General. Perhaps these Tory Law Officers blushed when the newspaper which they had funded was sternly criticised by the Lord Justice Clerk during the trial. The prosecution team also included two Tory Advocate-Deputes Duncan M’Neill (later a Dean of the Faculty of Advocates) and Robert Dundas. Stuart had seven counsel, all Whigs, led by Francis Jeffrey and including Henry Cockburn. There was no dock. Stuart sat at the Bar of the court accompanied by a small posse of distinguished supporters including the Earl of Moray, a leading Scottish aristocrat. He was part of the defence in a very real sense.

The trial began with Stuart entering a plea of not guilty to the charge of murder. The next stage was something not seen in modern practice, an opening speech by the defence counsel Henry Cockburn before the jury was selected. Cockburn began by giving his reasons for making the speech. The first of these was to provide a statement of the facts to enable the Court “to judge on the bearing and relevancy of [Stuart’s] defences.” He was anticipating the possibility that the Court would rule out any parts of the defence which sought to get round the strict rule of law that killing someone in a duel is always murder. Cockburn’s second reason was an overture for the main piece. Counsel said that Stuart wanted his position set out at the beginning of the trial  “because  this  is  a  proceeding which  involves  considerations  to  the  party  far  dearer  to  him than  his  life.” It was a question of honour and Stuart wanted the world to know his position from the outset just in case the trial collapsed before he got his chance to explain himself. This sounds contrived. There was an obvious advantage in taking the first opportunity to put the case to the jury.

Cockburn then alluded briefly to the political undercurrents in the case promising not to delve into that any more than was strictly necessary. He deftly dealt with the tricky issue of speaking ill of the dead. He said of Boswell that he wished –  “….we  could  pass  through  the  business  of the  day,  without  casting  even  a  shade  of  doubt  on  the  memory of  one  whose  unfortunate  loss  has  occasioned  this  discussion. I am afraid that we cannot.  But  I  trust  that  your  Lordships will  go  along  with  me,  and  keep  it  always  in  remembrance, that,  if  we  shall  be  obliged  to  charge  that  person  with  impropriety,  we  are  most  willing  to  ascribe  it  to  indiscretion alone.”  He went on to say that Boswell had a great gift for irony and that his conduct here could understandably be ascribed to the propensity all men have to exert the talents for which they are known. Writing about the case years later Cockburn was much less charitable about Boswell saying –“The fact of a person of his rank writing anonymous libels, for a blackguard newspaper, against an acquaintance, in a disguised hand, affords a humiliating example of the extent to which faction and bad taste may corrupt men even of bold temperament, and accustomed to the society of gentlemen” (Memorials p399). His last word on Boswell at the trial was a somewhat patronising observation that even the friends of the deceased must accept that the lustre of his memory could not be increased by concealing the full facts.

Cockburn then embarked on a line which sounds extraordinary to a modern reader but which must have seemed obvious to all concerned at the time. He described at length Stuart’s family connections including the fact that his father had nearly succeeded to the title of the Earl of Moray. Stuart’s father Charles had been a Presbyterian minister at Cramond Kirk but had left the established church to pursue a more eccentric calling. In a letter to a friend at the time of the trial Scott described the elder Stuart as  a foolish old man who has spent his whole life in finding a north-west passage to heaven…All this argues a touch of madness, which, as they come of a very respectable family in Fife (where all the gentry are a little crazy), is not improbable.” 

Cockburn then told the Court that the present Earl of Moray was right there in court supporting Stuart having  – “chosen  to  forego  the  privileges  of  the  peerage,  which  would  have  given  him a  place  beside  your  Lordships,  and  with  great  manliness  and good  taste,  has  rather  preferred  to  sit  at  the  bar  with  his relative  and  his  friend” – take a bow your Lordship.  Next came an exaltation of Stuart’s impeccable character which, Cockburn assured the Court, would be vouched “by disinterested  and  spontaneous  witnesses, — all  tendering  their  services,  from  the  ranks  of  his  political adversaries.”  

Cockburn then gave a detailed history of the two newspapers and of the published items which libelled Stuart. He spoke of how Stuart bore these attacks with patient courage and of how the Whig Song had an “edge” and a “lustre” thanks to the talents of its author. In a florid passage he said  – “These  arrows  struck  the  mark  for  which  they  were  intended,  and  they cleft  that  heart  they  were  directed  against,  though  the  quiver from  which  they  came  had  not  been  discovered.”

Cockburn then described how the author was exposed, the dealings between the seconds and of how Boswell’s refusal to apologise for making bad jokes made the duel inevitable. Of the duel itself he said only that “they fired together and Sir Alexander fell.” It could be taken for granted that the duel was conducted fairly by the character and the presence of the seconds. He finished what was undoubtedly an elegant speech by emphasising the great suffering occasioned to Stuart by Boswell’s slurs and by stating that, in fighting the duel, Stuart “acted under the operation of a great moral necessity, and  that  a  verdict  of  Not Guilty  is  the  result,  which  will  give  most  satisfaction  both  to the  law  and  to  all  reasonable  men.”

 The Solicitor-General declined an opportunity to reply to Cockburn’s speech save by saying  – “the  pannel  is  entitled  to  the  favourable  benefit  of  the  able and  eloquent  statement  which  has  just  fallen  from  his  counsel.” 

At this point in the proceedings the jury was selected. There was no ballot. There were forty five prospective jurors in attendance and from this List of Assize the presiding judge selected the fifteen jurors. Of these eleven were landed gentlemen including Sir James Dalyell of Binns. The other four were (of course) men and were by occupation, a clothier, an ironmonger, a wine merchant and another merchant of unspecified wares. According to the Scotsman account of the trial “the jurors were almost to a man the political opponents of Mr Stuart and.. the party who had fallen was of some rank, and of some consequence to the side in power….” Perhaps the defence team were unnerved by the Lord Justice Clerk’s picks.

The Prosecution Case

The evidence followed a pattern familiar in modern practice with the Crown leading its evidence first and with some cross-examination of witnesses. The questioning was relatively brief by current standards and there were no acrimonious exchanges between counsel and witnesses. With one notable exception very little of the evidence was actually contentious at all. The two distinguished seconds spoke to the events leading up to and including the duel. 

The contentious matter was whether Boswell was in fact the author of some or all of the libellous pieces. The evidence on this was all over the place. In cross-examination by Stuart’s senior counsel The Earl of Rosslyn offered the opinion that all the pieces, including the specimen letter signed by Boswell, were in the same handwriting although some attempt had been made to disguise the handwriting of the Whig Song. No one asked how he was able to reach that conclusion. The Crown led witnesses who said that the Whig Song was not written in Boswell’s hand. These included, his cousin Alexander Boswell and James Walker the tutor to his children. Defence counsel did not challenge this evidence in cross-examination. The Crown then led William Lizars, a well known engraver, who said that on first sight he thought that the libellous pieces were not written by Boswell but that on seeing them again with other specimens of Boswell’s handwriting he had changed his mind. 

A key piece of evidence taken from the Earl of Rosslyn in cross-examination was that Stuart bore no ill-will or resentment against Boswell. Stuart, he said, acted out of “a deep sense of the unavoidable necessity of vindicating his own honour.”  Senior counsel went to town on this line when he made his speech to the jury. The Crown made no attempt to question whether Stuart really had no option but to risk two lives in order to salvage his honour over a state of affairs for which he was not to blame. Whether, for example, Stuart could have let sleeping dogs lie in the Sentinel Office. 

John Douglas was examined for the Crown by Boswell’s friend M’Neill. At one stage near the end of this Stuart’s senior Francis Jeffrey objected to a line of questioning. Before Jeffrey could explain his grounds of objection Stuart caused a stir when he intervened and addressed the Court directly saying –“My  Lord,  the  more  complete  this  investigation  is,  the  more  agreeable  it  will  be  to  me  and  I  have to  request  of  my  counsel  not  to  object  to  any  questions  put by  the  Counsel  of  the  Crown.” Jeffrey appeared flustered by this as any counsel in his position would be. He said, no  doubt with as much dignity as he could muster, – “It  is  not  in  every  case  I  would  be  disposed to  yield  to  any  such  request  on  the  part  of  a  client,  but  here I  am  disposed  to  allow  the  fullest  possible  investigation.” This might have been a ploy on Stuart’s part to create a good impression with the jurors. It seems unlikely that Jeffrey was a party to it. On the contrary he may have taken umbrage. His junior John Cunninghame took on the cross-examination of Douglas moments later.

 In that cross-examination Douglas said that Stuart’s conduct on the field was in every respect “consistent with that of a man of honour and courage.” Given that an unhelpful answer would have been hugely damaging counsel must have been very confident of getting this reply despite the fact that this was evidence from a crown witness from the Boswell camp. He would not have been the first (or last) counsel to damage his own case with an over ambitious question in cross-examination.

The Crown closed their case without trying to prove that Stuart was maliciously out to get Boswell before he got his hands on the libellous pieces from the Sentinel Office or that he acted dishonourably in any way before, during or after the duel. Their attempt to prove that Boswell was not the author of the offensive material was feeble. 

The Defence Case

According to Cockburn writing a few years later – “If the prosecutors were really anxious for a conviction, their hopes vanished long before their own case was closed” (Memorials p396). If that really was his assessment when the defence case began it was not shared by his senior Francis Jeffrey who, judging by his exhaustive presentation, thought that his client remained in serious jeopardy throughout the trial. 

The law then in force did not allow Stuart to give evidence on his own behalf. The defence opened their case with two witnesses who gave unchallenged evidence that Stuart was astonished to discover that Boswell was the libeller and that he had not suspected this before he got his hands on the Sentinel papers. The Crown did not challenge that evidence. One of these witnesses was James Gibson. He said that in the afternoon of the day on which the duel occurred Stuart arrived back in Edinburgh and met with Gibson. Stuart was very upset about the plight of Boswell. Stuart told him that he had not taken aim and that he wished he had as he would have been certain to miss because he had never fired a pistol on foot before. No mention was made of the obvious risk that he might well have been shot himself while in the act of taking aim. According to Gibson he advised Stuart to leave the country. Stuart refused to do so at first out of concern for Boswell. No one asked what good he thought he could do for his opponent at that stage by remaining in Scotland. He eventually agreed to go to France on condition that Mr Gibson gave notice of Stuart’s willingness to stand trial. 

Another friend of Stuart’s called Thomas Allan gave evidence as a defence witness about breaking the news of Boswell’s death to Stuart in France. Stuart was very upset. Allan consoled Stuart by telling him to remember that the duel had been forced upon him. Stuart replied “but remember his poor wife and family.”  Another noble sentiment which Stuart’s counsel must have thought would go down well with the jury. Then there were more witnesses to the fact that the libellous writings were in Boswell’s hand. His Bank Manager, a Mr Gairdner, echoed the Earl’s evidence by opining that the manuscript of the Whig Song was partly disguised by the deceased.

The final chapter of evidence for the defence came from a raft of Tory gentlemen who gave character evidence for Stuart. Dr Robertson Barclay said that Stuart was well tempered, not quarrelsome. Mr Erskine of Cardross, who had been sitting at the bar of the court with Stuart’s team, said that the pannel was mild and gentle and that “there was more of the milk of human kindness in him than any person I ever met with.” Other witnesses described Stuart as remarkably good tempered, as honourable and not disputatious. None of this evidence was challenged by the Crown. No one mentioned Stuart’s violent public attack on Stevenson in Parliament Square not long before the fatal duel.

The defence closed their case with Cockburn reading to the jury the libellous material including the offending verses of the Whig Song which he (presumptively) declared to have been “proved to be in the handwriting of Sir Alexander Boswell.”

Closing Speech by the Lord Advocate

The Lord Advocate began by promising the jury a short speech. He was as good as his word. The opening part was an exercise in self-justification. He trusted that the jury would agree that he could not be criticised for bringing the prosecution because when any death occurs by violence, however “low in society” the deceased might be, there should be a trial. In this case a trial was –  “eminently  required,  where  an  individual  has suffered,  it  certainly  must  be  admitted,  by  illegal  violence, where  that  individual  was  in  the  prime  of  life,  the  father  of a  numerous  family,  a  zealous  and  active  magistrate,  a  Vice- Lieutenant  of  a  considerable  county,  a  person  gifted  with talents  and  qualities  alike  useful  to  society,  and  to  endear  him  to  the  circle  of  his  private  acquaintance.” Bringing the case was the right thing to do for the deceased’s suffering family and for the accused who should be convicted if he is guilty and should get the benefit of an acquittal if he is not. Unsurprisingly the Lord Advocate said nothing about the Beacon or the Sentinel. He did not mention the libellous material, the events leading up to the duel or the duel itself. He made no criticisms of Stuart’s conduct at any stage of the affair.

The Lord Advocate then dealt with the crux of the case. He said that on any view of the law the charge had been “proved most distinctly” by the undisputed evidence that the duel took place and that Stuart fired a loaded pistol at Boswell. He said there was no defence to the charge and he stated “without fear of contradiction from my Learned Friend” that, as a matter of law, shooting some-one in a duel cannot be self-defence. He said that the jury were not entitled to consider the circumstances giving rise to the duel or to proceed as “a not so much a court of law as a court of honour.” The Lord Advocate was, of course, correct about this but it seems clear that he thought that the jury would be permitted to look beyond the letter of the law. He ended his speech by saying (again) that he had done his job by laying all the relevant evidence before the jury and he added – “I heard  with  much  satisfaction  the  statement  which  was  made in  defence, and  all  the  evidence  which  has  been  brought  forward  in  support  of  it.  These  are  now  before  you,  and  you will  judge  of  them  without  my  entering  into  the  circumstances with  which  they  are  connected…… I  leave  the  case  with  you,  under  the  directions  which  you will  receive  from  the  Bench,  to  aid  you  in  forming  your  opinion  of  the  evidence  produced….. I  am  sure  your  verdict  will  be  satisfactory  to  the  country  and  to  your  own  consciences.” The Lord Advocate was leaving it to the Lord Justice Clerk to tell the jury whether they had to apply the strict law. He did not even attempt to run an argument that the pannel should be convicted in a court of honour if it came to that. 

Francis Jeffrey’s Speech

This was as long as the Lord Advocates’ was brief. Given that it started in the early hours of the morning it must have felt like a long three hours for the jury to endure. Jeffrey began by agreeing that the Crown were correct to bring the prosecution to enable the full truth to reach the public domain. He then, with a cockiness that might not have appealed to all the jurors, predicted that it would not be difficult to induce the jury to deliver Stuart from the danger of a conviction.

Jeffrey then majored on the absence of malice or wickedness on the part of Stuart saying –  “though,  unluckily,  his  hand  was  the  instrument  of  Sir Alexander  Boswell’s  death,  he  did  not  kill  him  wickedly  and maliciously ;  that  his  mind  was  pure  from  every  spark  of  malignity,  vindictiveness,  or  rancour ;  that  he  acted  in  this  matter from  motives  totally  unconnected  with  personal  animosity  ; and  that  he  ought  now  to  be  considered,  not  as  having  committed  a  great  crime,  but  as  having  fallen  under  a  great  calamity.” There were three strands to this. The first was to counter the Crown’s over-zealous allegations in the indictment about Stuart scheming to kill Boswell. The defence line was that since the Crown had failed to prove this that was an end of the matter. The second was that there could be no crime if there was no malicious intent. That was correct as far as it went but, as with the first strand, it ducked the central issue of whether malice should, in accordance with the letter of the law, simply be inferred from the mere act of shooting at an opponent in a duel. The third strand was to pave the way for a defence in the court of honour if the Court (the judges) would permit this.

At this point Jeffrey set out to persuade the judges and the jury that the full defence centred on Stuart’s conduct and character was “admissible.” He made the startling submission that, although duelling may appear to be an “evil practice…..imperfect, unequal and immoral…..in point of historical fact it has come as a corrective to greater immoralities and a preventive of greater crimes…” How so? – because it had “superseded the guilt and atrocity  of private assassination.” Counsel then went into orbit on this saying  – “that  to  this  practice…..we  are  not  only indebted  for  the  polish  and  refinement  that  belong  to  the members  of  our  upper  society,  but  for, — what  is  a  great  deal more  valuable, — not  only  the  high  and  general  esteem  in which  courage  and  intrepidity  are held, — but  also  for  the  universal  diffusion  of  fairness,  manliness,  forbearance,  and  handsome conduct  among  all  the  Gentlemen  of  the  land.” To the modern reader this is pompous guff with a dollop of snobbery mixed in. Maybe it was entirely acceptable to his audience of peers although Cockburn, writing about the trial a few years later, described duelling as “an absurd and shocking remedy for private insult” (Memorials p396). As Jeffrey acknowledged in other parts of his speech there was in that age, as Alison had said, widespread abhorrence of the practice centred on strong political and moral objections to it. We should, however, credit Jeffrey with a keen sense of what would go down well with this jury.

Jeffrey then employed another line still present in the populist playbook by saying that in countries where there is no practice of duelling to settle disputes amongst gentlemen (he mentioned Spain, Portugal, and Italy) “assassinations  are  daily  occurring,  poisonings,  stabbings,  the  basest and  most  cruel  murders.” Tempering this, if only to the extent of assuring us that this could never happen in our country, Jeffrey said that if duelling was abolished here it would lead to private and secret meetings without witnesses or other safeguards to ensure fairness. 

The next section of the speech contained detailed references to passages from the writings of “authors of the highest and strictest morality and of the deepest sense of religion” in support of his arguments that duelling was both legal and morally justifiable. These included Samuel Johnson, Professor Adam Ferguson and Lord Kames. On this and on other points Jeffrey’s eloquence outshone the quality of his arguments. Some of the passages he quoted were more nuanced than his headline argument which was that a gentleman who received an insult was morally obliged to demand satisfaction. Johnson made it clear that his personal wish was that this “superfluity of refinement” did not exist and Ferguson referred to it as “a caprice of manners in modern times.” Taking up a proposition touched on by Lord Kames, that a statutory ban on duelling is absurd law because it contradicts “honest principles,” Jeffrey developed a highly dubious argument that the statutory prohibition had been “abrogated  by  a contrary  usage,  and  by  that  change  of  times  and  manners, which  we  know,  in  this  country,  can  effectually  wipe  away all  penal  enactments,  whether  formally  repealed  or  not.” Furthermore juries had consistently acquitted duellists despite the statutory prohibition and in the face of judicial directions that killing an opponent in a duel is murder. According to Jeffrey  it  was – “a  proud  and  fortunate  circumstance  for  this  country,  that  such  an  institution  as  a  jury  should  exist,  with power  occasionally  to  temper  the  severity  of  that  law,  which a  court  of  another  description  would  too  inflexibly  enforce  ; and  thus  silently  to  abrogate  statutes,  or  maxims  of common  law,  that  the  course  of  the  times,  the  progress  of manners,  the  disappearance  of  some  crimes,  and  the  rise  of others,  may  have  rendered  inapplicable  and  unnecessary.” Were the jury taken in by this, or bamboozled or did they simply switch off and fall back on the sum of their personal prejudices, their common sense. Later in the trial the Lord Justice Clerk directed the jury that – “as  to  what  moral  writers  may have  said  of  the  advantages  which  may  have  arisen  from  this practice  of  duelling,  this  affords  no  safe  ground  of  judgement.”

In modern times it is not unheard of for defence counsel to take some liberties with the facts but not to the extent which Jeffrey did in this case. Duelling had been illegal since at least the early seventeenth century and by 1822 the numbers of duels in Scotland had decreased. One might reasonably contend that the law had had some deterrent effect. Jeffrey turned this on its head. Without any evidential support for this he said – “I  believe  it  is  mentioned  somewhere,  that,  in  the  short  reign  of  Henry  IV  of  France [1589 to 1610],  no fewer  than  4000  gentlemen  were  slain  in  duels ;  and  it  is quite  well  known,  that,  during  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth centuries,  the  same  practice  prevailed  to  an  intolerable  excess  in  these  islands.” Times had changed by 1822. He quoted statistics about the prevalence of duels during the reign of George III (1760 to 1820) in Great Britain and Ireland taken from “a book perhaps of no great authority.”  The figures quoted were about 170 duels resulting in 60 to 70 deaths leading to about 20 trials for murder and 2 or 3 capital convictions. According to him there had been very few Scottish cases and none within the last 150 years had resulted in a conviction. He added (without any evidential basis) that duels were, by 1822, confined to honourable contests between gentlemen. The law had achieved its purpose. Having arrived at that state of affairs, Jeffrey argued, it was proper that these cases should always be prosecuted leaving it to the accused to prove circumstances which make his case an exception to the general rule. In a case where the killing was not malicious and where the accused had behaved honourably a conviction would be “the most extreme of all absurdities.” 

Jeffrey then lifted the code of honour to dizzying heights in submissions about the need for a gentleman to defend his good name. According to him if Stuart had not challenged Boswell to a duel he would have been placed in a position of – “living  as  an  outcast  from  society — of  being exposed  to  all  manner  of  insults  and  contumelies — of  being excluded  from  all  honourable  pursuits  and  professions — shrunk  from  by  [his]  ancient  friends—the  cause  of  blushing  to [his] relations,  and  sorrow  to  [his] children-—the  stain  of  an honourable  name,  and  a  hopeless  outcast,  and  exile  from society — without  hope,  means,  or  chance  of  restoration.” It was monstrous to suggest that he was guilty of murder. It was a matter of self-defence. This is where his argument crashed into the law because Hume had made it abundantly clear that it was no such thing. Jeffrey knew that and was happy to blur the distinction between what the law actually was and what he thought it should be. He was aiming at two possible outcomes. Either that the Lord Justice Clerk would leave the door open to this defence or that the jury would disregard any direction from the bench which sought to close it down. 

To keep his defence within manageable limits Jeffrey made a concession which the circumstances of this case conveniently allowed. The defence has two necessary ingredients. First, that the duel was fairly fought and second that it was fought for an honourable reason. He sought to illustrate this by an exhaustive survey of recent duelling cases in England and Scotland. At one point deep into Jeffrey’s speech a rumour circulated outside the Court that a verdict of acquittal had been returned.  Jeffrey was drowned out by loud shouting from Stuart’s supporters. Perhaps one of the weary court officials was the source of this rumour. If he was, his relief was short lived and proceedings resumed once order had been restored. 

Jeffrey dealt with one of Hume’s three recent cases at some length. In 1798 Major Macdonell of Glengarry was acquitted of the murder of a fellow officer Lieutenant M’Leod despite being “egregiously to blame in the origins of the quarrel.” Glengarry picked a quarrel with M’Leod over an imagined insult at a regimental ball and supper. He then indulged in “unpardonable excesses” by striking and kicking the young man. In fact this case undermined Jeffrey’s own point about the defence being confined to cases in which the duel was fought for an honourable reason. There was nothing honourable about Glengarry’s behaviour. It illustrated the difficulty of departing from the strict rule and leaving it to the jury to apply their own variable judgement of what was criminal.

The grand finale of Jeffrey’s speech reiterated at considerable length his main theme that Stuart acted out of necessity. Seemingly confident that he was on the same wavelength as his audience he said –  “ I  trust,  therefore,  you will  not  find  him  guilty,  for doing  that  which,  in  his  circumstances,  you  must  feel  that  every  one  of  you  would  have done  ;  that  which  you  must  in  your  hearts  wish  that  the best  and  dearest  friend  you  have  in  similar  circumstances should  do.”  It would have been unsurprising if he had added that Boswell himself would have voted for acquittal had he been on the jury.

The Lord Justice Clerk’s Charge to the Jury

This opened with His Lordship referring to Stuart as “the unfortunate gentleman at the bar.” Only the most optimistic prosecutor would have taken that to mean that a misfortune was about to be visited on the pannel by the judge. Turning to the law his Lordship wound the clock back to the influential jurist Sir George Mackenzie who, in 1678, described fatal duels as “illustrious and honourable murders” adding that he wished this was not the case because “honour persuades men that obedience is cowardice.” (Mackenzie’s Criminal Institutes Title XII p72). Next he returned to the passages in Hume which made it clear that self-defence is not available in these cases “whatever may have been the history of the quarrel, and though the deceased may have fallen victim to his own insolence and indiscretion.” The judge then referred to the most recent edition of Hume in which the learned author included references to the three recent cases cited by Jeffrey (including Glengarry) which resulted in acquittals.  The Lord Justice Clerk pointed out that Hume had adhered to his strict view of the law despite having these recent cases distinctly in view. 

Had his Lordship left it there Stuart might have been in deep trouble but the judge then embarked on a line which was much more favourable to the defence. He cited another influential author John Burnett who, writing in 1811, followed the same line as Hume on this but with an all important addition. Having described the general principle excluding self-defence and having mentioned the same three recent cases Burnett went on to say – “ Notwithstanding  of  this,  it  may  be  difficult  for  a  jury  to  lay  out  of  view  altogether,  in  a  case  of  homicide  in  a  duel  brought  to  trial  at  common  law,  the  circumstance  on  which  side  the  original  aggression  lay,  or  the  nature  of  the  antecedent  provocation……..without  regard  to  who  was  the immediate  challenger   thereby  making  allowance  so  far  for the  notions  of  honour  which  usage  and  custom  have  sanctioned” (emphasis added Burnett’s Criminal Law Cap 1 p47). 

Modern lawyers would find it impossible to conclude that a handful of verdicts returned in contradiction, arguably in defiance, of settled law was a sound basis for permitting juries to follow the same course in all subsequent cases. Furthermore, in the Glengarry case the jury had given a written explanation of their verdict stating that Glengarry had narrowly saved his own neck by making a belated offer to apologise shortly before the duel. They also stated that  – “ it  was  proper  to  observe,  that  the  jury  had  no  idea  of finding,  by  their  verdict,  that  what  is  called  fairly  killing  a man  in  a  duel,  could  afford,  by  itself,  any  defence  against  a charge  of  murder.” That case could not sensibly be taken as sanctioning a practice of the sort described by Burnett. Nevertheless, his Lordship in Stuart’s case told the jurors that he had quoted this material to them “as showing the course of modern practice on this subject.” He could not bring himself to say that they must apply the strict rule in Hume or that they were entitled to disregard it. The direction quoting Burnett’s dubious proposition that recent acquittals somehow sanctioned a departure from the strict rule gave the jurors a licence to return a verdict based on their notions of honour. 

The Lord Justice Clerk then turned to the circumstances of this case and gave a series of directions which were highly favourable to the defence. First, he criticised the part of the Indictment which alleged that Stuart had conceived a plan to challenge Boswell before he had obtained the Sentinel papers pointing out that the Lord Advocate had abandoned this by the time he made his speech to the jury. Second, the judge told the jury that the defence had proved that Stuart had no prior knowledge of Boswell’s involvement before he obtained those papers. Third, his Lordship turned to the evidence about the duel itself beginning with a ringing endorsement of the Earl of Rosslyn’s evidence – “Generally  speaking,  the  evidence  has  been given  in  a  very  distinct  manner ;  and  I  would,  in  particular,  say,  that  the  evidence  of  the  Noble  Lord,  one  of  the  seconds,  was  given  in  the  most  correct  manner  I  almost  ever heard.” No place here for the cardinal principle of modern criminal trials that the jurors are the sole judges of fact.

Then came a series of directions which must have been music to the pannel’s ears. The Sentinel pieces were “offensive articles of the most aggravated nature” and gave the “unfortunate gentleman at the bar ” good cause to complain. Were gentlemen of that age, the judge included, really so precious about their reputations? Or was it simply necessary for his Lordship to reassure the like-minded jurors that there was a just cause of sorts for challenging Boswell to a duel. Next, his Lordship told the jury without the necessity of them applying their own minds to it that there was nothing improper in the manner in which Stuart had obtained the Sentinel papers. Likewise they were bound to be satisfied that Boswell was indeed the author of the libels because Boswell had never denied this and because (always a clincher) the Earl of Rosslyn said so.

His Lordship then endorsed the evidence of Stuart’s honourable behaviour repeating what Jeffrey had said about “the very becoming way” in which he had expressed grief about the death of Boswell and had expressed concern for his wife and children. His Lordship turned to Stuart’s general character saying that this must “necessarily weigh greatly” in determining whether Stuart had a malicious intent to kill. For the benefit of any jurors who slumbered through the evidence on this his Lordship said –   “sure  I  am  you  will all  agree  with  me  when  I  state  to  you,  that  I  never  had  occasion  to  witness  a  stronger,  more  perfect,  and  more  entirely concurring  body  of  evidence  in  favour  of  character,  than  the prisoner  has  this  day  exhibited.  And  it  is  another  remarkable feature  of  the  greater  part  of  this  evidence,  that  it  has,  with extreme  good  taste,  been  extracted  from  the  mouths  of gentlemen  who  happen  to  be  politically  opposed  to  the prisoner.” At this point the judge reached the high point of his pro-defence directions  saying  “with  such  a  body  of  evidence  as  this,  it is  impossible to  require  higher  testimony  of  the  improbability  of  a  crime such  as  that  here  libelled.” 

Conscious, perhaps, that he had gone too far the Lord Justice Clerk then commented on the defence line that Stuart acted out of necessity. He said that this was –  “a  delicate  and  dangerous  position  to  put  the  case  upon  ;  for  I  apprehend  the  rule of  law  is  quite  clear  in  cases  of  this  description,  that  no  false punctilio  or  notion  of  honour  can  vindicate  an  act  which  terminates  fatally  to  another  fellow-creature.” It was nonetheless a consideration that they could take into account along with the other circumstances favourable to Stuart which he summarised again before telling the jury that these all gave them a case “well  deserving  of  your  most  calm, deliberate,  and  dispassionate  consideration.” The judge conspicuously avoided saying anything else about duelling. He did not mention the policy considerations underlying the legal prohibition as summarised by Alison. His Lordship must have been one of the many of his class who thought that duels were an acceptable form of alternative dispute resolution.

In the penultimate passage of his charge the judge reverted to his major themes and laid to rest any suggestion that the strict rule of law must be applied. He made it very clear what he would have done had he been a juror by saying –  “You  will  consider  the  charge,  the  evidence for the  charge,  and  the  strong  body  of  evidence  which  has been  brought  forward  on  the  part  of  the  prisoner.  You will  recollect  that,  as  to  the  narrative  part  of  the  charge — that  of  malice  in  seeking  a  quarrel — it  has  been  directly negatived  ;  and,  with  regard  to  anything  like  personal  rancour,  there  is  the  strongest  evidence  that  no  such  feeling  entered  into  the  mind  of  the  prisoner.  Considering,  therefore,  the  circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed — the  strong necessity  he  felt  himself  under  to  vindicate  himself—the  deliberate  way  and  manner  in  which  he  set  about  his  vindication,  not  proceeding  instantly  himself,  but  sending  to  the Noble  Lord,  whom  he  employed  as  his  friend,  who  told  him that  he  had  no  other  alternative  but  to  act  as  he  did — the total  absence  of  all  rancour — the  great  sorrow  that  he  expressed  on  account  of  the  fatal  consequences  of  the  meeting, and  the  uncommon  body  of  testimony  to  the  mildness  of  his character, — taking  all  these  things  into  your  consideration, you  will  consider  whether  you  can,  with  propriety,  pronounce him  Not  Guilty.”

The judge concluded his charge with a swipe at the Beacon and the Sentinel expressing a sentiment which has a contemporary ring –  “It  is  one  of  the  greatest  misfortunes  and  evils  of  the  present day  that  we  have  to  witness  the  disgraceful  licence  of  the  periodical  press.” To this he added an observation which enraged the widow of the deceased –    “and  I  do  lament,  from  the  bottom  of  my heart,  that  the  unfortunate  gentleman  deceased  should  have had  any  concern  with  writings  of  this  description, — for  it  is impossible  to  shut  your  eyes  against  the  evidence  by  which it  is  proved  that  Sir  Alexander  Boswell  was  engaged  in these  writings.”

The Verdict 

At about 5 am the Jury conferred for a few minutes without retiring. Their  Chancellor (Chairman) Sir  John Hope then announced their verdict – “My  Lord,  The  Jury  unanimously  find Mr  Stuart  Not  Guilty.” No doubt the jurors regarded the case as clear cut but they may also have been anxious to avoid the risk of more wordy speeches or directions if they hesitated before reaching a verdict. The result was celebrated by the large crowd gathered in Parliament Square. Stuart evaded the supporters waiting there but they caught up with him in Thistle Street where he urged them to curb their celebrations.

 According to Cockburn “Never was there such a triumph. Never were wretches so wretched as the Crown counsel that day! Never was calumny so put down.” (see Chalmers p104). Not for the last time the prosecutors in a case which resulted in acquittal were painted as the villains of the piece. Apart from the over aggressive indictment, crown counsel played with a relatively straight bat in the course of the trial. As Cockburn himself acknowledged they could not be faulted for bringing the case given the state of the law. Borthwick undoubtedly had cause for complaint about his harsh treatment. He was released without trial after Stuart was acquitted and the Lord Advocates’ conduct in prosecuting him was heavily criticised in Parliament. It may have cost him the customary reward for a retiring Lord Advocate, a seat on the Court of Session bench. 

 The case was widely reported in the press throughout the English speaking world. After the trial the Scotsman declared that the judge’s charge was – “admirable and judge-like in every respect…that it was admired by all who heard it – that it will receive the approbation of the country at large.” Not everyone agreed. Lady Boswell wrote a number of furious letters to Walter Scott attacking the Earl of Rosslyn (heaven forbid), Douglas, Cockburn and others. She railed against the Lord Justice Clerk for throwing obloquy on the conduct of her husband. She suggested publishing her grievances against him in a newspaper. She lamented that he would remain in office until the “Government removed him to a better place and the Almighty to another place.” Scott advised her not to go to the press or to intervene in the legal process. Lady Boswell was still writing letters to the Lord Advocate two years after the trial challenging the fact that her late husband was the author of the libellous pieces.

Having lavished praise on the judge and the jury for being “pure and impartial” the Scotsman, with a Napoleonic flourish, asked – Had the presiding judge been disposed to select a jury of shopkeepers for the purpose of influencing them by a charge of a very opposite description what might have been the consequence to Mr Stuart – what the disappointment to the country.” This was the newspaper lending gentle support to a Whig campaign to end what Cockburn referred to as the “abhorrent practice” of the judge selecting the jurors.

The Scotsman excoriated the Lord Advocate, “his minions” and the other Tory politicians for their involvement with the Beacon and the Sentinel describing them as “a knot of place hunting ultras of Edinburgh. It posed the question  – “Is the Government of this part of the country still to be entrusted to those who have openly patronised the base and lurking assassins of reputation and character?”

As for Stuart, having preserved his precious reputation by killing Boswell, he trashed it six years later when he was sequestrated for debt and fled the country in disgrace to avoid his creditors. These included the Widow’s Fund of the Writer’s to the Signet Society. Stuart had held the post of Collector of the Fund and had secretly borrowed from it a sum with a present day value of about £400,000 applying the money to his own use. This was, of course, a gross breach of his fiduciary duty to the Fund. Other persons who were near relations and clients of Stuart suffered large losses at his expense. History does not record whether the Earl of Rosslyn was one of them.